Karen Cronick
INTRODUCTION
“Nationalism” and “citizenship” are belief systems based on “us-them” exclusion
cultures. In our times they manifest themselves as social constructions (Berger
and Luckmann, 1967) related to political structures such as nations. These
concepts are also characterized by, either a collective need to erect
protective walls and garrisons against “foreign” invasions, or the tendency to
organize local armies to invade and occupy other lands.
This essay is
built on the idea that culture is a social construction with historical
determinants. The very idea that people can have some sort of “knowledge” about
their shared reality -and can call it “culture”- is socially constructed over
time. The formal concept of social constructions has been elaborated chiefly in
the writings of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann; they
affirmed that:
[…] reality
is socially constructed and […] the sociology of knowledge must analyse the
process in which this occurs. The key terms in these contentions are 'reality'
and 'knowledge', terms that are not only current in everyday speech, but that
have behind them a long history of philosophical inquiry (p. 13). […. ] the
sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between human thought
and the social context within which it arises. It may thus be said that the
sociology of knowledge constitutes the sociological focus of a much more
general problem, that of the existential determination (Seinsgebundenheit) of
thought as such. Although here the social factor is concentrated upon, the
theoretical difficulties are similar to those that have arisen when other
factors (such as the historical, the psychological or the biological) have been
proposed as determinative of human thought (p. 16).
I will not
develop Berger’s and Luckmann’s theory here. Suffice it to say that this essay
purports to examine “the concrete relationships between thought and its
historical situation” (p 17) in a particular social and historical context,
that is, one in which ideas of nationalism and citizenship can develop, and how
they influence our own modern age.
I will not
consider the Marxist idea of “false consciousness”, because it is based on the
idea that there can be a true sociological consciousness, which is, in itself a
social construction, and furthermore it is irrelevant to this essay. Also, I
will not develop the idea of provable scientific knowledge, because here I will
limit my reflections to non-provable ideas that have to do with how human beings
interact with each other, and their relationship to power. The role of science
in this context would be limited to registering and documenting opinions in a
given context.
In this
essay I will consider the problem of nationalism in terms of cultural
exclusivity and xenophobia. I will also review: a) the historical development
of the concept of citizenship, b) the idea of the common good when it is a restrictive
value, c) political identity values and the social consciousness that underly
them, and the d) concept of community as a cultural identity.
I will
review present-day and historical development of these concepts. Their origins are
deeply held cultural manifestations that explain, justify, and elaborate
current social beliefs, and come from religious doctrines, loyalties to a king
(or other sovereign), and in-group bonds. It is important to examine their etiology in
order to understand their present impact. We have inherited these ways of
understanding the world through ancestral ties that are still deeply felt. In
order to question them we must understand their heritages.
NATIONALISM,
DEFINITIONS AND HISTORY
Nationalism
is profoundly tied to identity values, and has ancient origins. We can begin to
explore the concept as a political allegiance that unites individuals to their
native land (and later political state) as a supreme value surpassing all other
allegiances. Miller, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008), defined
nationalism as:
the supremacy of the nation's claims over other
claims to individual allegiance and which features full sovereignty as the
persistent aim of its political program. The state as a political unit is seen
by nationalists as centrally ‘belonging’ to one ethno-cultural group and as
charged with protecting and promulgating its traditions.
The nation
that requires this loyalty may, however, contain diverse ethnicities,
religions, and political views. Miller (2025) observes that:
Nationalism as a system of beliefs, or
ideology, comes in many different shapes and forms, and can be combined with
other belief systems. Thus one can be a conservative nationalist or a socialist
nationalist; one can also be a Christian nationalist, an Arab nationalist, and
so forth.
He therefore
placed nationalism as a modern ideology, that is, as a global belief system
that can be compatible with other beliefs.
Hans Kohn
(2025) emphasized the supremacy of this system which he perceived as ethically
higher than other locally occurring structures (such as religious or
neighborhood attachments); it is an “ideology based on the premise that the
individual’s loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpass other individual
or group interests.” Miller, also, has made this dominance explicit; he said: “nations
are ethically significant, in the sense that people who belong to them have
special duties to their compatriots that are not owed to human beings in
general.”
This last
observation is crucial. It not only places nationalism above religion,
ethnicity, and other values, it creates a hierarchy of “human beings”, in which
people from within one’s nation have more value than others do. When
nationalists consider other nations as enemies, the lives of the people who
inhabit them are less respected than those of their own country.
Kohn
observed that, defined as an ideology, nationalism is relatively modern. However,
people have always been attached to their native soil and to their inherited
traditions; the idea of “nation” has only become an explicit motive for political
action since the XVIII century. But it has a long history. We can also consider
it as an ethic/historical posture, and as a long-standing political mien: the
idea that the interests of one’s own soil, polis, kingdom or country override
those of other political bodies is not new. For example, Aristotle’s ideas of the
self-sufficient polis included the notion of Greek identity and the value of
the exclusive common good of the Greek homeland generally, and Athens in particular.
He distinguished the Greeks from the "barbarians” and favored Greek in-group
loyalty.
CONNECTION
TO COMMUNITY
The Open-Learn
editors (n.d.) linked national identity to the idea of community. They asked, “who
is Them, and who is Us?” And they noted that there can be many, overlapping
communities, and people can belong simultaneously to a range of them within a
given nation. But, as we have observed, people see themselves as national
subjects first, and their various personal and collective identities are
surpassed by their national uniqueness. Even on a state level, and even in
situations of dramatic change such as revolutions or coups d’état, in which governmental
leaders may change, the national political entity remains mostly intact. When
large migrations happen, and people become stateless because of poverty or war,
these national and cultural attachments weaken, but do not disappear. They
remain as nostalgic attachments in which names, cuisine, music, and other
identity features live on.
Ownership
Nationalism is also a variant on the idea of the
community’s ownership practices. It is based on the possession of a shared
territory, that is, a combined extension of land that “belongs” to a given
group of people. They also share a ethos with historical importance, and
symbols that enforce a common identity. Their land has resources, and their
culture includes policies favoring domestic control that are designed to
protect their people and their belongings against foreign aggression.
Often
nationalism is related to private property as foundations for sovereignty. Ownership
relates to nationalism through the ideas of property rights, colonialism,
racism, and dispossession. Erik Fuglestad (2022, p. 145) observed that:
Historically and geographically, there have
existed many different kinds of property regimes. There are forms of collective
property or state property found in the former Soviet Union, there is feudal
property with overlapping rights and dues, and property regimes where rights of
use are more important, or at least as important as rights of ownership. There
were also different kinds of ancient property regimes, such as those that
existed in ancient Egypt and Israel, or in Babylon. These systems varied, but
were generally marked by a combination of individual ownership rights and
imperial or monarchical rights over land and property.
He also
observed that local power structures are connected to regional property rights:
economic power, dominium over others and various forms of authority.
Max Weber (1930)
has linked styles of economic management with religious affiliations, affirming
that the protestant ethic motivated the members of the protestant religions in
Germany to save their money, and thus they promoted national wealth. However,
in a very interesting criticism of this position, Felix Kersting, Iris
Wohnsiedler and Nikolaus Wolf (2019) examined the population data of the German
Empire of Weber’s time, comparing statistics about economic development with
religion, and found little correlation between Protestantism and economic
growth. They found that the German Empire was characterized by ethnic and
religious fragmentation, especially in relation to the Polish and Germanic
sectors. These ethnic differences affected development more than the Protestant
influence did[1].
Nationalism
is related to the idea of the general physical wellbeing of the people who live
there. Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, written in 1776 (2012) spoke of an "invisible
hand," that moderates individual efforts to maximize their own gains. There
have been, however, doubts that the general good can be achieved as a naturally
occurring collective phenomenon. Garrett Hardin (1968) criticized this position
because he felt that collective groups like nations cannot solve their problems
by social or technological means. Hardin argued that the unregulated,
collective use of “the commons” will inevitably ruin it. The only way to
preserve the common good is to legislate its use. In this sense, the commons,
as a concept, is like all cultural possessions, in that it must be processed,
evaluated, constituted, and regulated. This requires the introduction of new
political concepts regarding definitions of what, precisely, is the common good[2].
Not all
identity concerns related to territory have been exclusive. They are generally
divisive, but at times there have been leagues and treaties that have
recognized and promoted cooperation between different kingdoms or nations. For example, the Iroquois Confederacy was an
alliance that lasted for centuries. It included six indigenous nations in North
America (the Seneca, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Tuscarora tribes).
They promoted mutual peace, and employed a self-governing system that they
called the Great Law of Peace. Their decisions were largely consensual and
counted on the participation of the women (Clan Mothers) in leadership
positions. Other examples include the Hellenic Leagues in ancient Greece,
formed by distinct city-states, with the objectives of promoting trade,
collective security, and the prevention of internal wars. The Roman Empire also
achieved a sort of internal armistice with the imposed peace of the “Pax
Romana”, in which a compulsory internal order existed inside the Empire; it
lasted until the death of Marco Aurelio in 180 a. C. And then it reappeared in
the Holy Roman Empire during the Middle Ages.
A modern
example is the European Union (EU), which began to function with the
participation of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West
Germany in 1948. It now includes 27 countries[3],
and has given Europe internal peace for almost 80 years -an unprecedented
achievement for the region. The EU has
gone beyond the ideas of trade or defense agreements, because its charter
promotes the idea of an inviolable human dignity that surpasses nationalistic
culture. The citizens of the EU enjoy an unlimited freedom of movement that
permits them to cross the Union’s internal borders and to reside in whatever
member country they want to. Individual liberties such as the freedom of
thought, expression, religion, and assembly are guaranteed by the EU Charter.
CITIZENSHIP
The concept
of citizenship has always been closely related to the ideas of territory and
ownership. In ancient Greece it was related to the tradition of extended
families, and was recognized for all men who descended from citizen parents. It
was a status closely related to military service in each city-State. Athens
had, perhaps, the most complex idea of what it meant to be a citizen of all the
Grecian states, and was a concept that changed radically during the first millennium
(b.C.). It was always a restricted advantage,
reserved for free, adult males with both Athenian parents. Citizens had voting
rights, and could own land, but as has been usual throughout history, women,
slaves, and foreigners were systematically excluded. The idea was formalized by
Pericles' law in 451 B.C. to protect democracy by limiting who could participate.
There was a special class of foreigners/residents called “Metics”[4]
that were not citizens, but came from other Grecian polices. They held a status
similar to that of modern permanent residency, being permitted indefinite
residence without political rights.
In the
polis of Sparta there were three classes of citizens with different rights and
obligations. All of these categories were acquired from birth: a) the Spartiates
were citizens with full rights, b) the Mothakes and Perioikoi were free but
were not considered citizens, c) and the helots were agricultural serfs who had
almost no rights except to cultivate an assigned plot of land, and who also
served in the military. The helots underwent an austere military training from
childhood and formed the army’s foot soldiers[5].
All these strata were ruled by a diarchy of two kings and an oligarchy of
elders and ephors. Free Spartan women enjoyed somewhat greater legal rights
than elsewhere in classical antiquity.
Roman
citizenship was similarly restricted in the early days of the republic, but as
Rome became more imperial, the idea was expanded to include all free (male) people
across the Empire (Edict of Caracalla, 212 AD)[6].
It was a considered a privilege and was hierarchical with the upper classes
having the most advantages. In some cases, people from conquered lands, and even
slaves, eventually gained access to freedom and citizenship.
In the Middle Ages, the idea of a collective,
geographically restricted identity was related to urban centers and fiefdoms. Burghers
and feudal lords had rights such as parochial protection, trade privileges, and
a certain local voice based on their payment of taxes, and their collaboration
when military action was required.
There are
long historical traditions in which conquerors and kings have claimed land and territories
as their own. Within each of these spaces their followers could then claim land
and resources, and erect palaces or castles there to affirm their ownership.
They surrounded these possessions with “their” peasants, serfs, crofters or
sharecroppers. At each level the inhabitants considered that the land was
“theirs”. Collectively they all belonged to an ethnicity, kingdom or a nation,
although there might exist a certain cultural diversity. They felt that they had
shared interests, which were mediated by their loyalty to their monarchs or
political leaders, and this loyalty was a sort of undefined enfranchisement, or
a right to belong in a given group.
They all had
some sort of interests of their own to defend because they were subjects of a king
whose territory also belonged to them. They were part of a culture that defined
them, but they also had their own power over certain “things”, like their
dominions, their plot of land, their crops and animals, their castle, their
house, their shop, or their place in the open market.
In modern
times people own or control strategic industries or resources. The idea of
domestic control is linked to limiting “foreign” takeovers, and is formalized
through decrees and laws. Ownership itself historically has formed a basis for
national identity and sovereignty. It is the legal and political bond between
an individual and a state, and defines the rights and duties (like voting
rights, legal protection, allegiance, taxes, and military obligations[7]).
It signifies full membership in a political and legal community, and reciprocal
responsibilities.
Some countries
allow dual citizenship while others do not. In democracies, this implies an active
involvement in civic life. As a rule, citizenship cannot be revoked. Citizens
have a right to acquire a passport, thus assuring the international recognition
of their status.
Both
historically and in modern times, however, there have been discriminatory laws
associated with disfranchisement and outright apartheid, that have limited the
rights of some classes of citizens.
AUTHORITY
Mkrtchyan’s
(2025, p. 47) interpretation of the concept of authority in Arendt (1994) described
a belief structure that commands respect and even obedience. It
precludes the use of external means of
coercion; where force is used [and it is] incompatible with persuasion, which
presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. Where
arguments are used, authority [is in] abeyance. [In this concept Mkrtchyan
perceives] “several core aspects that more broadly illustrate authority’s
distinctness […] [A]uthority’s solid foundation is voluntary obedience; it
requires a hierarchy whose rightness and legitimacy” are recognized.
This
interpretation has several implications. First, the power structure must be
intricately interwoven with the belief system that sustains it. This could
relate to a belief in democracy, but the author also says that “Arendt purports
that authority rules out any persuasion backed by arguments and implies an
unquestioning recognition” (p. 49). Thus, since democracy has at its core an
unending process of citizen debate, this understanding of authority precludes a
belief in parliamentary government.
Cronick (2025b) examined closed belief systems that, although not enforced by repression
and violence, can lead to their unquestioned acceptance. She revisits the story
of Abraham, the Old Testament patriarch who unquestioningly obeys what he
believes to be God’s command to scarify his son Jacob. She observes that:
Abraham, a wealthy Israeli patriarch from
prehistoric times, appears in the Old Testament as Noah's heir. The sequence of
events is: God tested Abraham saying that he must take his only son, Isaac, to
Moriah, and offer him as a burnt offering. Abraham obeyed, and erected an
altar, laid out the wood, bound his son Isaac, and laid him on the altar on top
of the wood. Then he took up a knife with the intention of killing him. But the
Angel of the Lord called him from heaven saying not to do it. Once Abraham had
shown obedience, it was not necessary to actually carry out the sacrifice.
Cronick
(2022) observed that this kind of obedience signifies the acceptance of a
doctrine, an ideology or the simple acceptance of an existing authority. This
system can be based on ideas of national or racial superiority, a religious
identity, or just an existing ethnic culture. It can also be the keystone that
supports a complex belief structure that has, in fact, been created by
political leaders to justify their claims to power. Although the leaders may
hide these motives, they may appear in euphemisms.
FINAL
REFLECTIONS
In this
essay we have reviewed the concept of nationalism as an exclusive belief-system
that underlies the defense of the nation-state, and justifies its leaders’
expansionist intentions. It has been characterized as a supreme,
all-encompassing identity structure, a social construction that surpasses all other,
more local identities, and has, for its adherents, a profound ethical
importance. It even surpasses the moral implications of a collective humanity,
because it attributes greater value to the lives of co-nationalists than it
does other peoples. It essentially divides people into two categories: us and
them.
It has
strong ties to ownership in that the land, the buildings, the crops and
animals, and other objects that are “owned” by the inhabitants are considered
to be intimately related to the nation. In this sense it is also related to
well-being, and the members of the national groups feel they are entitled to a
reasonable amount of security, health, and prosperity. These people are
“citizens”, that is, they are exclusively enfranchised to benefit from the
wealth produced in the nation, although there may be hierarchical limits to
this expectation. In turn, the citizens are expected to comply with certain
obligations such as paying taxes and military service. The right to citizenship
has been restricted historically according to birth-right, sex, and other
requirements.
Nationalism
is strongly related to the concept of authority. This may imply the voluntary acceptance
of core, cultural beliefs, such as the right that the country’s leaders have to
legislate the realm’s laws and expectations.
Cronick
(2025a) has considered possible ways of overcoming unquestioned nationalism and
other inherited belief systems. She reviewed certain cultural aspects involved
in undisputed obedience, and also ways to confront undue compliance. In another essay (2025b) she reviewed how G.H.
Mead (1972) understood obedience, and also ways of overcoming it. Mead said that the person is not completely
subject to the norms of society; they can say "no" using their inner
voices. According to Mead, the person is
structurally divided into the "I" and the "me", and can
create an inner dialogue that permits them to challenge cultural norms. The “I”
represents immediate experience, while the “me” contains people´s already
elaborated identities. Thus, new experiences can modify old identities.[8]
She asked, what
are the collective mechanisms for awakening a social consciousness? In this
essay I have concentrated on the more onerous forms of nationalism. She said
that clarifying the meanings and implications of rules that we obey may
facilitate the formation of new appreciations about them. New experience may
enhance new judgments. One way of doing this is to question the origins of
these beliefs, that is, to examine their sources. And it is important to listen
to dissident voices. Mosovici (1996) told us that one important tool of
resistance is found in the social environment, especially in the presence of an
active minority that can help relieve the pressure to conform. Hearing just one
contradictory voice can allow us to express our ideas more independently.
In short,
all ideologies can eventually be questioned, and nationalism and other
ethnocentric loyalties are no exception. The tools for doing this are to be
found in understanding their historical justifications, in permitting dissidence,
in questioning authority, in accepting diversity, and in establishing
cooperative agreements such as those that promote free trade, peace and
tolerance.
[1] Weber had called these ethnic differences “racial”, and maintained a stance of anti-Polish nationalism.
[2] Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1995) idea of General Will does not refer to inherited beliefs that lead to wellbeing. Rather, it is a reflection on how self-determination might be achieved. It is an idea of the common good seen as source of convened decisions that overcome factional desires, and that lead to the formation of popular sovereignty. Citizens obey laws derived from the General Will because they believe that they, as individuals, form a decisive part of a collective interest.
[3] Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
[4] In France, the word «métèque» is used to refer to immigrants in a xenophobic sense.
[5] The Helots were probably the original inhabitants of the land around Sparta, and were semi-enslaved by the Dorians. In spite of the severe indoctrination they received, they staged several rebellions, most notably during the Second Messenian War (c. 660-650 BCE), and later around 464 BCE. They were essential for the survival of their Spartan masters, but also, they were feared by them.
[6] The Edict of Caracalla was a decree issued by the Emperor Caracalla. It granted Roman citizenship to nearly all free (masculine) people in the empire. In a practical sense, it expanded the tax base, but it also created a general sense of civic identity.
[7] And the rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”….
[8] Sartre (1989) and Schütz (1993) had similar ideas about people’s capacities to modify their previous identities.
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